Frenemies forever: Iraqi Shi’a after Mosul

An Iraqi wears a badge of the Iraqi flag with an 'Elect Iraq' slogan on it. Toby Melville/Reuters/PA Pool/PA Archive/PA Images. All rights reserved.With the liberation of Mosul a certainty, if not an imminent
one, international attention on Iraq is largely focused on rebuilding the
war-torn city and fostering intra-communal reconciliation.

The former is
understandable as the immediate needs of Mosul are great and tangible. The
latter also fits into western conceptualizations of Iraq, two decades after
intervention, which views the country as comprised of three distinct and
uniform communities: Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd.

Meanwhile, back in Baghdad Iraqi Shi’a political parties and
elites have long shifted focus away from defeating the Islamic State. Instead,
they are returning to patterns of infighting habituated by decades of
coalition- and relation-building in both the pre- and post-Saddam Iraq.

No such thing as
structural political unity

While Iraqi Shi’a parties and elites did circle the wagons
as the Islamic State bore down on Baghdad, once the Hashd al-Shaabi militias (Popular Mobilization Units) emerged, at
the behest of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa calling Iraqis to arms, and American-led
airstrikes began the existential nature of the threat of the so-called Islamic
State was effectively nullified. 

Political unity of Iraq’s Shi’a parties and elite [nearly] only
occurs in response to a common enemy, which most recently took the form of the
Islamic State and in previous periods had been Saddam Hussein and the United
States.

Contrary to popular discourse, Iraq is not three cohesive
ethno-religious blocks that act in unison. In fact there has been no such thing
as structural political unity for Iraqi Shi’a for at least the past two and a
half decades. When such unity does materialize it quickly disappears and is
replaced by vicious competition.

Drain the Baghdad
swamp

A contemporary example of the unscrupulous nature of Iraqi
Shi’a coalition- and -relation building is Moqtada al-Sadr, who has rather opportunistically
seized upon the pro-reform, anti-corruption protests that have been taking
place in Baghdad since the summer of 2015 by throwing his and his movements weight
behind the protests.  

The protests were in support of a reform drive that was primarily
the work of another Shi’a politician Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi, which on
its surface would suggest either support from a fellow Shi’a, Sadr, or at least
disagreements kept behind closed doors.

Al-Abadi, however, has little political base within his Dawa
party of State of Law coalition and as a result has seen his efforts at reform
stymied. Instead of supporting, Abadi Sadr took the public position that the
reforms do not go far enough, creating headaches for Abadi who struggled to
elicit any support for the reforms from fellow Shi’a inside and outside his own
party.

Many see Sadr’s calls for reforms as disingenuous since
members of his movement are integral partners in the political process.
Sadrists representatives sit on the Electoral Commission, for example, which was
recently the target for reform by Sadr and his followers. Sadr is likely
supporting the protests calling for reform, and not necessarily the reforms
themselves, to energize his political base and attract new supporters in the
run-up to next year’s parliamentary elections.

Moqtada al-Sadr and his movement are deeply enmeshed in the
political system that he currently rails against and the protests are a tool
employed to try and hammer his opponents with.

Preserving a
kleptocratic pie

In this environment of renewed competition Iraqi Shi’a
political elites do not share common views on much. Deep divides persist between
Iraqi Shi’a parties over what role clerics should have, whether Iraq should
move towards a federal structure, and the desirability of Iranian influence in
the country. These fundamental positions of the major Iraqi Shi’a parties make
long-term alliances an impossibility.

Perhaps the sole thing they can agree on today is the preservation of a political system that
permits state capture for the sake of perpetuating patronage networks. This
system was consolidated after intra-Shi’a violence abetted in 2009 with the
defeat of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Although violence throughout the country raged on, the
fighting between Shi’a groups was replaced by competition over resources of the
Iraqi state, a trend that accelerated under the premiership of Nouri al-Maliki
(2006-2014).

Today, corruption is a deeply entrenched feature of the
Baghdad political terrain. Iraqi Shi’a political groups and elites shifted away
from violence to competing over revenue from oil sales and control over ministries
and parliamentary committees in order to employ family members and supporters.

In addition, Iraqi political elites continue to favor the
status quo of a centralized state, despite the promises of devolution to Iraq’s
provinces. The reason for this being that a centralized state in Baghdad is one
that is easier to steal from.

 Plus ça change aux Baghdad…

While these elites have so far managed to fight off attempts
at reform, popular grievances against poor governance, insecurity, poverty and
inadequate service delivery remain unaddressed. Even the storming of the Iraqi
parliament in Baghdad’s Green Zone in May of 2016, jarring as it was, proved
unable to move the needle on the substantive reforms so desperately needed. So then
what becomes of Iraq if the status quo is maintained?

The last 25 years of Iraqi history shows that despite
violence and acrimonious political rhetoric, Iraqi Shi’a parties are still
likely to form alliances to contest upcoming elections with their ostensible
rivals. If the sustained pressure of the reform protests can continue to be contained,
Iraq’s political elite will likely manage to cobble together a government after
the 2018 parliamentary elections that is no more responsive to its constituents
than before.

Steps forward

Mosul will require substantial bandwidth and resources from
external actors for the near to medium term, deservedly so. The next crisis, however, will almost
certainly involve the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for January
2018.

External stakeholders should look to ways to support more
productive competition between Shi’a parties that results in parties and
leaders that are more receptive to the needs and wishes of their
constituencies. This can be accomplished at least in part by facilitating
confidence building and reconciliation between existing Iraqi Shi’a political
groups.

In the spirit of more productive competition, external
stakeholders can provide long-term support to Shi’a social movements, civil
society advocacy groups and even nascent parties. Fostering a counter weight to
the stagnant Iraqi Shi’a political class external stakeholders can help to
challenge the complacency of the established elite. This could take the form of
long-term core funding to these groups or discrete training courses held
outside the country.

Ultimately, an additional focus on promoting the quality,
legitimacy and diversity of Iraqi Shi’a political representation will translate
in strengthening cross-ethno-sectarian reconciliation efforts in Iraq.