Russia’s cautious role in Syria

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin (L) view a military parade in the Russian-run Hmeimim Air Base in the coastal city of Latakia, Syria, on Dec. 11, 2017. Picture by Syrian Presidency/Xinhua News Agency/PA Images. All rights reserved.What
is Russia doing in Syria? Is
it protecting the regime of its ally Bashar al-Assad from falling? Is
it protecting its own geopolitical interests alongside Iran’s in
the Middle East against the United States’ hegemony? Is it really
bothered by the rise of Islamists
and terrorists, as Russian
President Vladmir Putin claims?

The
Arab Spring changed the face of domestic politics and foreign
policies in many countries, from Tunisia
to Bahrain.
However, Syria
could be seen as the most catastrophic location
due to the existence
of major
regional and international stakes, in addition to a growing
ethno-sectarian conflict and the rise of transnational terrorism,
which directly affects
neighboring
countries
like
Iraq
and Lebanon.

Endless
debates
can be had
on Syria today, ranging from the US-Russian rivalry to the hunting of
Kurdish fighters by Turkey or the Iranian paramilitary expansionism,
along with sectarianism, terrorism and many more. However, one of the
major conclusions this conflict brought to light is an unusual, more
confident Russian participation in the Middle East – in fact, its
first since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Syria,
like many other Arab countries, faced a wave of protests during the
Arab Spring in 2011 demanding a
better
economy
and political freedom.
Within less than a year, the country witnessed the formation of an
armed opposition in response to the regime’s crackdown on
demonstrations.

Nevertheless,
the power vacuum within a new and leaderless opposition, trapped
between several regional and international interests and funds,
caused an early breakup, as foreign fighters from all over the world
were sent to fight in Syria for very different reasons than the
original demands of the demonstrators.

Indeed,
Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim fighters from all over the Arab world and
beyond joined the frontlines of governmental and non-governmental
forces in Syria. Some even joined growing terrorist organizations
such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

Facing
this chaotic or complex scenario, we cannot deny that Assad’s
regime would not have lasted without the support of Lebanese
Hezbollah, Iran and most importantly Russia. Russian
strikes began overshadowing the Syrian skies in September 2015, as
requested by the Syrian government and approved by the Russian
parliament.
The
motto “one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”, perfectly
suits the Syrian issue when it comes to the US-Russian debates about
it, at least up until the Trump administration, which presented more
commonalities with Putin.

Today,
Russia
holds
air
and naval military
bases on Syrian soil, but while the US differentiates between the
terrorists and the opposition, the former seems to view both as one –
and it is from here that
both
super powers face a tragic disagreement.

The
question here is about
Russia’s alliance with the Syrian regime: how far would Russia risk
its relations with many of the players involved in the Syrian
conflict beyond this? Or is
it that what
happens in Syria stays in Syria?

Russia
has been constantly avoiding direct engagement with the US in Syria

US
strikes

One
of the most recent US-led strikes on the Syrian regime, led
to
Russian military casualties near Damascus and Homs in April 2018.
The most significant relations at stake for Russia is the one with
the US, which has proven to be notably tricky in Syria.

Russia
has been constantly avoiding direct engagement with the US in Syria,
despite having casualties within its own military personnel amid
domestic angers and concerns in Moscow by civil society and the
families of the victims. If Russia does not have the confidence to
directly retaliate against US attacks in a country where it has
military agreements with the regime, then when will it ever? The
Russian blind eye on the US involvement near its own military forces
is another sign of Russian doubtful presence in Syria, and is similar
to the US haphazard strikes just to boast their strength.

Israeli
strikes

The
Soviet Union has always supported
regimes opposed
to Israel in
the region, and now it is associating with the regional triangle’s
(Syria, Hezbollah and Iran) greatest enemy – Israel. Whilst Israel
continuously increases its military involvement in Syria under the
proclaimed threat of Hezbollah and Iran near its borders, Moscow and
Tel Aviv develop economic, military and political cooperation.

In
fact, the relationship between the two countries has not witnessed
such prosperity in decades. The relationship reached a level where
both countries even established a joint military committee, where
both ensure Russia’s military armament in Syria, and in particular
to Hezbollah’s locations, does not harm Israeli jets in
the Syrian airspace.

Despite
all of this, Israeli warplanes did not hesitate to attack the Syrian
regime’s T-4 air base, where Russia, alongside Iran, stationed
their military warplanes and equipment.

European
strikes

The
UK and France joined the US in launching
strikes
last April with a strong international support from Germany, Canada,
Turkey and the EU in response to what they claim was a chemical
attack by the Syrian regime on the city of Douma.

If
we were to imagine a world where Russia is not powerful enough to
face the US, is it not strong enough against the UK and France? Why
would its main reaction to the European involvement in striking the
Syrian-regime-held areas be to call an emergency meeting at the UN
Security Council? Russia in Ukraine for instance, is more assertive
than the Russia we know of in Syria. Or would an aggressive Russian
retaliation against European strikes automatically entail one against
the US?

Turkish
military involvement

Russian-Turkish
relations have witnessed their
highest ups
and downs
throughout the Syrian conflict. The two strategic energy and economic
partners clashed interests in the Syrian conflict: while Ankara
funded and hosted Syrian opposition members, Moscow was Assad’s
most prominent backer.

The
biggest clash occurred when Turkey shot down a Russian jet in Syria
in November 2015. Turkish
leader Erdogan apologized in June 2016 and the Russian sanctions
which ensued after the incident were lifted – and since then, a
multilateral strategic partnership developed between Russia, Turkey
and Iran, where they work on finding solutions to the Syrian crisis.

Nevertheless,
fundamental differences in their views on Syria have ensured a
continuous clash of interests even throughout the recent developments
of their relationship. Moscow
might have played a role in softening Ankara’s approach towards
Assad’s regime,
but it has not been able yet to limit their military involvements in
Syria.

Turkey
has conducted five different military operations on Syrian soil since
2015 – justifications vary
from fighting ISIS, Rojava (Syria’s Kurdish region) to
the relocation of a tomb. The most recent operation
is the Turkish invasion of Syria’s Afrin, where Turkey aims at
driving the Kurdish YPG fighters out.

Today’s enemy, can be tomorrow’s friend, and vice versa

YPG
is the armed wing of the Syrian Kurds’ Democratic Unit Party, and
they are the ideological partners of the Turkish Kurds from PKK
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party).
Ankara still enjoyed military and political confidence in Afrin
despite the fact that pro-Russia Assad publicly criticized it and
recognized it as a violation of Syria’s sovereignty. Even Moscow’s
recent alignment with Syria’s Kurds by
recognizing
their autonomous rule in a constitution draft would not minimize the
Turkish military actions in Afrin.

Due
to the deep complexity and the diverse contradictory involvements in
the Syrian conflict, no analysis can suggest itself to be definite,
including the one presented
here.

If
there is evidence that Russia avoids retaliation with the US in
Syria, then there is also evidence that it is not – and likewise
with the other arguments. In today’s Syria, key players created
temporary alignments with players who are arguably the enemies of the
former’s own allies based on common interests on the battlefield.
Therefore it would be inaccurate to consider the conflict’s
structure through the lenses of the officially announced alliances.
As today’s enemy, can be tomorrow’s friend, and vice versa.

Finally,
following
this analysis
– what is Russia doing in Syria if it is not reflecting
its ultimate willingness to take all necessary actions to
protect its ally, the Syrian regime, or
even
its
very own interests?