To the shores of Tripoli

Press Association/Hussein Malla. All rights reserved.Great Britain and Italy are preparing to send ground troops
to Libya. With little media attention and even less public debate, up to 6,000
British and Italian soldiers would be deployed to bolster the fragile unity
government in its efforts to end the lawlessness in the country and combat the
growing presence of Islamic State rebels.

The military effort hinges on the success of the new
government in merging the violently hostile factions that have been running
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as if they were separate countries since 2012; but
assuming the coalition holds, the west will have boots on the ground in yet
another Muslim country in 2016. It is almost certain that Britain already
has its Special Air Service (SAS) operatives in country, though the Ministry of
Defence refuses to confirm or deny those rumours.

The catalyst for this action is the success the rebels have
enjoyed in damaging or capturing Libya’s oil infrastructure. The most recent
incident was a suicide bombing
and rocket attack on
the oil port of Sidra. The various groups, including those swearing fealty to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, depend on the black market sale of crude oil for much
of their financing, with which they buy weapons and munitions in a thriving
trade.

Prior to the deposition and murder of Qaddafi, Libya produced
approximately 1.6 million barrels per day of
oil, mostly for export to Europe. European oil majors like Total, BP and Eni
were heavily invested in Libya’s state-run oil sector, providing much needed
technical expertise. Since the uprising, over a million barrels-per-day in capacity
has been lost.

The other motivation is the refugee crisis threatening
European solidarity and the Schengen Agreement. The primary conduit remains the
Turkish route from Syria, but no one should forget the large numbers of
refugees entering Europe via the Mediterranean route. Until the conduit through
Turkey stole the headlines, the southern route was already provoking
extraordinary measures by the European Union; including the illegal measure
of destroying smugglers vessels at sea without any court’s authorisation.

One of the main departure points for these smugglers and
their cargos of refugees is Libya, and Italy fears that a too-effective policy
of closing the EU’s Balkan borders will lead Syrian refugees to take the more
circuitous and dangerous, but still open sea route. Not that Syrian refugees
would go to Libya first – they would cross from Albania most probably – but
control of Libya’s ports would free Italian patrol vessels to concentrate on
other waters.

European leaders were less concerned with averting a humanitarian crisis than they were in expanding their influence in their old colony.

These developments are ironic because it was western
intervention that created a failed state in Libya in the first place. Certain
members of the European Union, coincidentally those with the largest
investments in Libya, became agitated at Qaddafi’s heavy-handed response to his
local Arab Spring uprising. When the Libyan military began using helicopters
and aircraft against protesters, Britain’s former Foreign Secretary David Owen
proposed a “no fly zone” over eastern Libya to be authorised by the Security
Council and enforced by NATO and Egypt. Russia and China refrained from vetoing
the measure on the understanding that it would not be an excuse for regime
change; and within days, NATO went from “no fly zone” to actively bombing
everything that moved in Libya except the rebels.

Recently released State Department communications – thank
you, Secretary Clinton – confirm that European leaders were less concerned with
averting a humanitarian crisis than they were in expanding their economic and
political influence in their old colony. A State
Department email from
long-time Clinton insider Sidney Blumenthal to then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton on 2 April 2011 lays out the reasons behind Nicolas Sarkozy’s support
for an expanded campaign against Qaddafi:

1. to gain a greater
share of Libyan oil production;

2. to increase French
influence in North Africa;

3. to improve the
government’s internal political situation in France;

4. to provide the French
military with an opportunity to reassert its position in the world;

5. to head off a Libyan
challenge to French economic interests in Francophone Africa through the
creation of a common currency based on the Libyan Dinar, and backed by
approximately 7 billion dollars of gold reserves.

A separate email dated 8 April 2011 confirms the
involvement of Egyptian forces for similar reasons to those of the French:
access to oil and gas, re-establishing influence in Cyrenaica, avoiding a
refugee crisis on the Libyan-Egyptian frontier and avoidance of an Islamic militant
resurgence in the region.

Egypt early on sent Special Operations forces to
bolster “their” rebels in Benghazi, providing much needed training and combat
experience. The same email indicates that Great Britain already had SAS
operatives on the ground in Egypt gathering intelligence and providing
assistance to the Benghazi rebels – long before David Cameron’s government had
even debated the use of force in parliament.

In the aftermath of regime change – excuse me, of NATO’s
successful humanitarian operation – the National Transitional Council was put
in place to attempt to restore order, disarm the militias, re-establish basic
services and organise elections. It was also supposed to hand out large
contracts to its western patrons in return for their support. Unfortunately –
for the council – then Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib apparently hadn’t read
the memo: he failed to deliver the goods. The State
Department files indicate that the French felt jilted that they had
received less than their 35% cut of new business deals and immediately
began undermining the very council they had helped set up less than a year
previously. With the help of Great Britain, the intelligence services of the
two nations began working with the Benghazi factions in an effort to create a
semi-autonomous region that would be more…cooperative.

It would be going too far to say that western meddling
caused the virtual division of the country into two almost independent states;
it is very possible that no government would have been able to hold it together
after 42 years of brutal repression by Qaddafi. There can be no doubt that
Franco-British efforts accelerated the process of disintegration, however. Into
the ensuing disorder swarmed the jihadists, seeking out the comfortable power
vacuum and their share of the profits from the largest oil reserves in Africa.
A ready-made excuse for intervention; and with 6,000 “advisors” keeping an eye
on things and establishing deep links with the Libyan military, the new unified
government is far more likely to draw the appropriate conclusions.

The only question seems to be how soon before the Marines
are sent back “to the shores of Tripoli?” Either because the British and
Italian force proves insufficient to deal with the jihadist threat or because
they prove all too capable and Conoco Phillips comes crying to protect their
investments, it seems likely that American troops will be involved sooner or
later. The American people will not be consulted; Congress will undoubtedly
roll over, as it always does when presented with the need to fight terror
anywhere and everywhere. There is little hope for this sordid tale to end well
for anyone, especially the Libyans, but hey: at least we averted that
humanitarian disaster.