ISIL, JAN, and the war economy in Syria

Excerpted from ‘ISIL, JAN, and the war economy in Syria,’ by Rim Turkmani,
(LSE, 2015), which is based on original empirical research drawing on
interviews with a range of respondents who live both inside and outside ISIL
held areas in Syria. It explores how the collapse of the state and the spread
of the war economy enable ISIL’s expansion and JAN’s infiltration in Syria with
particular focus on ISIL and presents options to counter this dynamic.

Demotix/Liberation KaFranbel. All rights reserved.The most important thing Syrians lost because of the conflict is
simply their state, which is exactly what ISIL is attempting to provide by
reversing the process of state collapse. The key to its success is that it
plans and acts like a state.
When it dominates an area and considers it part of the Islamic
State it acts as the one sole actor in charge. It ensures that it has complete
monopoly over the use of force in the area, and it has developed a
comprehensive model for running a proto-state; a model that includes governance and the provision of
public services, for example, judiciary system, policing, education, an army,
an ideology and indeed intelligence. It offers a surprisingly effective and
adaptive governance model. Its
reputation for governance is one of its key recruiting tools for both civilians
and fighters.

All other actors in Syria, individually or collectively, have so
far failed to develop a similar strategy. Even JAN, the closest inside Syria in
ideology and composition to ISIL, fails to present such a model. Instead JAN
acts like an actor among other actors, and its record on governance and public
service provision is poor. ISIL
also seems to plan for the long–term, reinforcing its state-like character. This
contrasts with other groups in Syria that tend to be trapped in emergency
short-term planning.

The war has also destroyed the local legitimate economy,
especially in opposition-controlled areas, and has led to the rise of illicit
economy that is centred on violence. ISIL and JAN are benefiting from the war
economy in Syria in two ways. First, the overall collapse of state control, the
formal economy and the governance of borders are providing ISIL and JAN with
opportunities to fund themselves from all kind of illicit activities such as trading in looted antiquities, extortion
and ransom.

The war has destroyed the local legitimate economy and has led to the rise of illicit economy centred on violence.

Second, areas dominated by the war economy environment are very
vulnerable to ISIL expansion and JAN infiltration. The extremely high levels of
unemployment, together with very high prices and the absence of other sources
of income, has left men of fighting age, who typically have to provide for
their families, in a very exposed position and vulnerable to recruitment by
extreme organisations. ISIL pays the highest combatant salaries in Syria
starting from USD 400 per month. It is followed by JAN which pays around USD
100 per month whilst most other armed groups struggle to match even JAN’s
salaries. The salary system for fighters in ISIL reflects the fact that most of
its high and mid-level leadership is composed of valued Arab and foreign
fighters, who are much better paid, ideologically driven and strongly believing
in the proto-state. The bulk of its fighting force is composed of Syrian men
who are paid less, not believers in the ‘state’ but had very little choice.

To adapt to the fact that the vast majority of Syrian combatants
are very unlikely to subscribe to the ideology and views of ISIL, it has
developed different scales of Bay’ah, the oath of allegiance given to ISIL by new recruits.
The highest in the bay’ah scale is the Khelafah one which means that those
giving this oath subscribe to the full views and rules of ISIL. A more Syrian
targeted type of bay’ah is the war oath of allegiance which is literarily a
contract in which the entity or the person who is giving the oath pledges to
fight common enemies with ISIL in return for financial and logistical support. The
common enemy is not necessarily the Syrian government. This does not appeal to
all Syrian armed groups which is why they also developed Bay’at Kital Al Netham, meaning an oath of allegiance to fight the regime.

ISIL seems to give
priority to the control of strategic resources in all of its military moves
inside Syria. This includes controlling oil resources, power plants, water
resources and all that is needed to provide bread including silos, mills and
bakeries. This has meant that other Syrian actors become dependent on ISIL
especially for the provision of oil. The lack of any legitimate
sources of much-needed diesel and other types of fuel in the countryside of
Idleb and Aleppo has given ISIL the opportunity to sell crude oil to these
areas, to make them dependent on it. The Syrian government is also dependent on
ISIL’s control of strategic resources. It is reported to be buying oil from
ISIL, it paid it transit fees for allowing wheat trucks from Hasaka to cross
its areas and it struck deals with it to ensure the provision of water to
government-controlled areas in return for providing electricity for ISIL
controlled areas.

The conflict has left Syrian society
deeply divided and susceptible to control, fragmentation or
manipulation. The rifts have
enabled ISIL to play people from certain communities or areas off against each
other. The conflict has also weakened social cohesion. The paper gives examples
of how areas that have maintained a relatively strong sense of social cohesion,
such as in Daraa, are far more resistant to the infiltration of both JAN and
ISIL.

Demotix/Björn Kietzmann. All rights reserved.ISIL controls
four areas in Syria with a strong Arab tribal presence. Tribes in these areas
were affected by different elements in the crisis as well as experiencing their
own internal conflicts. ISIL exploited these conditions and divisions for its own
benefit. It also developed different specific types of Bay’ah for tribes in
these areas to establish its control over them. Methods such as bribery and
revenue sharing have also been used to play tribes against each other and in
some cases to play members of one tribe against another.

The collapse of the governing system in Syria opened up a
political and ideological vacuum that was there for ISIL and JAN to exploit. ISIL is one of few actors
who had active preachers reaching out to the community and organising events to
market their ideology. ISIL puts most of its effort into recruiting and
brainwashing children rather than adults and thus building the foundation for a
future generation and society that is deeply embedded in its extreme ideology.
This is one of the most dangerous aspects of ISIL’s destructive actions.

The danger of
these activities by ISIL is severely
underestimated and the consequences are far-reaching. Current strategies and
measures by leading players in the coalition against ISIL, namely the U.S. and
the UK to combat ISIL in Syria are still quite inadequate to confront the real
danger of this organisation. The nature of ISIL and its ability to recruit
based on economic needs is not something that can be countered by aerial bombardment.

The main aim of any strategy to counter ISIL’s proto-state building approach must be legitimate state building.

International
efforts to squeeze the external funding resources of ISIL are not sufficient as
they propel the organisation to adopt increasingly violent means to control additional
resources. Also, cutting off ISIL funding requires more collaboration among the
various actors that pose as the enemies of ISIL.

The main aim of any strategy to counter
ISIL’s proto-state building approach must be legitimate state building. To
reverse the process of state un-building in Syria the most important step is to
end the conflict. Any contested area in Syria is a potential region for ISIL
expansion. Ending the conflict requires serious commitment to an inclusive
political solution that is supported by regional and international consensus.
Very strong emphasis also needs to be put on restoring governance in
opposition-controlled areas, especially those most vulnerable to further ISIL
expansion. Support for governance and civil society by members of the
international community should be within the framework of supporting peace and
stability and not supporting parties to the conflict.

Measures to counter the logic of war
economy in Syria should include reviving the legitimate economy and imposing
much stronger controls on the borders of ISIL areas with Turkey and Iraq. To
decrease the dependency on ISIL it is urgent to provide fuel for
opposition-controlled areas in a legitimate way and at a reasonable price and
to make jobs available for men of fighting age to reduce their vulnerability to
combatant recruitment. Relatively secure zones in
opposition-controlled areas should also be supported to sustain security and
restore services and the local economy for the benefit of the locals and IDPs.

There is also a
need for a strict policy on ransoms by all actors and countries and not accepting
any hostage release by paying ransoms to ISIL and JAN, even if a third-party
volunteers to pay the ransoms. Finally, support that enhances the humanitarian
situation for civilians should not be cut from areas that have presence of JAN,
since the termination of such support make civilians even more dependent on
JAN.