Countering the logic of the war economy in Syria

Excerpted from ‘Countering the logic of the war economy in Syria;
evidence from three local areas’ by Rim Turkmani with Ali A. K. Ali, Mary Kaldor and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (LSE 2015), which is based on
empirical research in three areas of Syria: eastern Ghouta, Daraa countryside,
and Idleb and part of Aleppo countryside. 

Flickr/Ali Almazawi. Some rights reserved.Within
four years of the armed conflict that followed the Syria uprising, the Syrian
economy has been reordered into a new decentralised, fragmented and regionally
and globally connected economy, in which the main economic activities depend on
violence and violence depends on those same economic activities. The country
has thus entered a vicious circle where Syria’s own resources are being used to
destroy it, and where ordinary people have no choice but to rearrange their
lives around the conflict and either join or pay (directly or indirectly) armed
actors in order to meet every day needs such as fuel and food. The degree of
this reordering varies hugely from one area to the other. The pre-war formal
economy has dramatically contracted while new illicit and informal
revenue-raising activities have greatly expanded. The financing of violence is
a combination of local resources and external, mainly regional, funding.

New societal condition

In eastern Ghouta, Daraa
countryside, and Idleb and part of Aleppo countryside, the main sources of revenue and employment before
the war began (agriculture, the public sector, small-scale trade and industry,
tourism) have shrunk dramatically. New sources of revenue are directly linked
to violence, the management of internal and external borders, the extraction of
local resources, and the absence of any regulation. They include bribery and extortion;
loot and pillage; unregulated trade, refining and building; smuggling of
people, human organs, fuel and antiquities and forging documents.

It is necessary to understand why those actors who have adapted their incomes to the new conflict situation have an interest in resisting any efforts to counter it.

This reordered economic profile is associated with the
emergence of a new rich class of leaders of armed groups and associated
businessmen, an impoverished middle-class dependent on remittances from abroad,
and an underclass, without means of sustenance, subject to continuous violence
of various kinds. Unemployment ranges from 60 percent to 90 percent, making
people vulnerable to combat recruitment.

In these areas, from which the government has largely
withdrawn, there are some nascent public arrangements such as the Local
Administrative Councils, but these bodies lack regulatory and service capacity
and their political power is dependent on the armed groups and on external
funders. In order to make sense of the dynamics
of the current societal condition, it is necessary to understand why those
actors who have adapted their incomes and revenues to the new conflict
situation have an interest in ensuring this situation is maintained and in
resisting any efforts to counter it.

Control of borders

The
main parameter, which explains the respective dynamics in the three areas, is
the borders; the way they are controlled, what and who is allowed to cross and
the fees imposed. Ghouta is completely surrounded under quasi-siege by government
forces, humanitarian aid is not allowed in and the flow of goods is benefiting
armed actors and war profiteers on both sides.

Daraa
has a border with Jordan which is strictly controlled by the Jordanian
authorities: they only permit cash and humanitarian aid and not commercial
goods to enter opposition-controlled areas, and they control the movement of
arms and fighters. Checkpoints at the borders with government-controlled areas
extract fees for the benefit of a network of war profiteers mainly on the
government side.

Idleb
and Aleppo countryside has a border with four different areas (Turkey,
Government, Syrian Kurdish forces and ISIL controlled areas) each with
different security controls: Turkey imposes few restrictions on what or who can
enter the country, allowing the entry of commercial and transit goods; fuel
arrives from ISIL controlled areas; and checkpoints at the borders with
government-controlled areas extract fees. The one policy that seems to be
shared by the Turkish, Jordanian and Syrian
governments is the prohibition on the legitimate
delivery of fuel into any of
these three areas.  

Demotix/GroundMediaTeam. All rights reserved.The
differences in border control affect the nature of the armed groups and the
nature of the war economy in the three areas. In Idleb, Turkey has facilitated the trafficking of combatants and
weapons of ISIL and Jabhat
Al Nusra (JAN). It also has a role in
determining which armed actors control border crossings and thus generate
income from it, while in Daraa
the presence of JAN and ISIL is less significant and most combatants are local
and less extreme. Because Ghouta is under siege, there are few if any foreign
fighters; most combatants are local and there is no presence of ISIL.

Borders also affect the economy of the area.
Turkey allows armed groups that have an affiliation with it to control the
border crossings, thus giving them access to an estimated USD
660,000 a day in ‘customs revenues’.
In contrast, Jordan refuses to allow armed groups to control the borders and
extract fees. In Ghouta there is strong evidence of mutually agreed measures on
controlling what goes in and out of the area where a well-established network
of businessmen, generals and commanders on both sides of the conflict profit
from this process, particularly from the dramatic increase in price of goods
inside eastern Ghouta.

In terms of the local economy and coping and survival mechanisms residents of Ghouta are forced to rely on receiving remittances,
producing diesel and gas from plastic or accessing assistance from
externally-supported projects and a few other limited opportunities. Residents
of Daraa also remain heavily dependent on remittances arriving through Jordan,
with some civilians engaging in smuggling activities. Trade is limited mainly
to what can be sold in stalls. In Idleb, there are more trade and construction
activities; some towns like Sarmada have benefited from trade across the borders
and the lack of regulation, some areas are relatively secure and agricultural
activities continue, and other areas, especially those close to borders with
government-controlled areas are severely impacted by violence—political
violence as well as violence associated with the war economy.

The diesel domino
effect

Most
of the opposition-controlled areas in Ghouta, Daraa and Idleb are rural areas
which are heavily dependent on agriculture. In the past, trade and industry in
these areas have had a strong agricultural link. Because there is no legitimate
delivery of fuel in these areas, the only source of fuel is the black market
where fuel is sourced either from either the government or ISIL controlled
areas. Fuel prices are seriously inflated as a result, with diesel 2.5 times
higher in price in Idleb, 3.4 in Daraa and up to 20 times in Ghouta. Because
the agricultural sector is very dependent on diesel for pumping water and
ploughing, inflation in diesel prices has made farming unprofitable. This, in
addition to the security situation and the lack of other important inputs such
as fertilisers, has contributed to the decline in agriculture and consequently
agriculture -related industry and trade.

Absence of state

What is going on in Syria is a societal condition rather than a short-term humanitarian disaster; a different kind of assessment and response is required.

The
collapse of the state
in opposition-controlled
areas is one main reason behind the restructuring of economic activities around
violence. Most importantly there is an absence of one central actor in charge
of public good, who could impose regulations that protect the public interest
and channel public resources for the benefit of the society. This vacuum is
filled to some extent by a muddled mixture of policies from neighbouring
countries, donor and humanitarian agency policies and de facto regulations imposed by controlling armed actors and their
political associates.

The
public resources of all the three areas are going directly to fund violence
rather than supporting public services, which are left to international donors
and INGOs to support.

Recommendations

The
core paradigm on which the following recommendations are based, is the notion
of transforming the societal
condition from one typified by the existing private and/or identity-based
mutuality, in which the different actors have a shared interest in continuing
the conflict, to a different kind of public mutuality that is centred on mutual
interest in stability, not conflict, and aimed at the public interest broadly
conceived.

The
economic co-dependency in the region, and between different areas within Syria
itself creates an opportunity for such public mutuality. Our research shows
that there is already a trend amongst conflict actors motivated by economic
aims and service provision in conducting talks and reaching agreements. What we
are proposing is that this private mutuality should be channelled into public
mutuality through deals that help to alleviate individual suffering and that
creates spaces where a legitimate economy can be promoted.

To achieve this, talks
about ending the conflict, at all levels—international,
regional and local—should
focus on ways to change the situation on the ground so as to create the
conditions for stability. Talks should also be much more inclusive at all
levels and include civilian actors. Even if they were to succeed, any high
level talks limited to those with a vested interest in the mutual war
enterprise would entrench the societal condition and lead to the persistence of
war economy even in the absence of war.

The
peace process needs to be understood as a multi-level process involving a
combination of talks at different levels that focus on changing the general
conditions and also the situation in specific areas including concrete measures
to counter the war economy and improve daily
life, alongside more political discussions aimed at reaching
a political settlement. Talks between Syrian actors could, for example, build
on a trend we have observed in understandings and agreements built around the
economic and infrastructure co-dependency of the different parts of Syria that
these actors control.

Demotix/Tharwa_Foundation. All rights reserved.At
the international and regional level, discussions should start now regarding
the general economic recovery strategy for Syria and establishing a framework
that could make possible a legitimate local economy and foster mutual economic
benefits for the broader society. Lifting the economic sanctions could be an
important tool in a negotiation framework. Negotiations for restoring control
of Syria’s international borders are also essential for ending the conflict and
reversing the war economy. Further, pressure needs to be applied at the
international level, on all the regional actors that continue to finance and
support violence in Syria. In addition, economic offences committed within
Syria, such as the loot and pillage of antiquities should be criminalised under
International Law.

Addressing
the collapse of the state is key to countering the war economy. There needs to be strong
emphasis on governance and a unified legal framework. In particular, income
generated from public resources,
such as fees at border crossings and income from oil, should be channelled
to finance public services and governance
structures in these areas, rather than the current
practice of financing armed actors. For example, pressure should be applied to
move the control of the crossings between Syria and Turkey to a civic authority
that adopts Syrian law and revenues
generated should support public services.

Addressing the collapse of the state is key to countering the war economy. 

If
we understand what is going on in Syria as a societal condition rather than a
short-term humanitarian disaster,
a different kind of assessment and response is required. Emergency aid is
neither suitable nor sustainable. Participants in this study were not
interested in asking for humanitarian aid. Rather, they consistently emphasised
the importance of agriculture, economic development, and education in order to
improve their situation.

At
the same time, Syria is not necessarily in need of the classical development
response, because conditions are not conducive to standard developmental
recipes. Needs assessment should include not only the needs of individuals but
also the need to revive the legitimate economy in the areas where they live. In
light of this, instead of thinking about categories of aid needed (humanitarian,
development, food support and so on),
it is essential to analyse
the specific combination of support required in each respective area. The aim
is to promote a virtuous local economic cycle that reduces unemployment and
increases stability by supporting legitimate livelihoods. This could help to
inspire in local residents a self-interest in the continuation of a stable
situation in their areas.

In
the rural opposition controlled areas, the requirements for reviving the
economy often relate to agriculture, such as restoring water infrastructure and
providing diesel, seeds and fertilisers. A specific proposal is the provision
of fuel, particularly diesel,
in a legitimate way and at a reasonable price; this is one key element that has
the potential to combat
the war
economy and revive the local legitimate economy.