The fragility of the European project

Election winner Mark Rutte and Geert Wilders (from behind) during the first talks inside the parliament in The Hague, Netherlands, 16 March 2017.Daniel Reinhardt/Press Association. All rights reserved.Even if you paid particularly close attention to the
polls of Holland's 2017 elections, there was a sense that anything was possible.
The morning news reported a high turn-out, long lines of eager voters waiting
for the voting booths to open. Volunteers handed out their particular flyers at
train stations, hoping to sway the few doubters still out there. Meanwhile,
this election received unprecedented media attention from all over the world.
All of them wondering the same thing: will the rise of populism infect the
Dutch electorate too?

The conventional wisdom was that centre-right candidate
Mark Rutte would serve a consecutive third-term. But right behind him stood
Geert Wilders, the figurehead of the nationalist Party for Freedom (PVV) and
the real star of the election. His position in the polls in the weeks before
the event shifted from lagging behind to dangerously close and everyone knew
better than to underestimate his appeal.

Then came the recent diplomatic skirmish between
Holland and Turkey, and the question was whether this incident would convince
enough voters of Wilders' thesis on the existential threat of Islam, or had
Rutte's commanding response to the incident sealed his victory? Anxiety among
europhiles and far-right excitement was palpable. A Wilders win meant another blow
to the suffering European globalisation project. The most powerful nations of
the world were waiting to see if the liberal bastion of the Netherlands could
fall prey to the kind of nationalism that had seduced England, America and was
on its way to enrapture France and Italy.

Exit polls

The exit poll quickly came to the relief of europhiles
within and outside Europe. Rutte would serve another term, even if his party
(People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD) had lost eight seats. The PVV
would move from third biggest party to second biggest party, gaining four
seats, nine behind the VVD. Rutte swiftly announced that ''Holland had said no
to populism!'', receiving congratulations from Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk and
every available liberal pundit.

This was a victory, a sigh of relief for Holland and
the European Union. But isn’t optimism premature? The fight between
centre-right and far-right is far from over, a battle that goes to the core of Dutch
national identity. Moroever, far-right forces are gradually winning this
existential battle, while Holland’s pro-European forces have the difficult task
of entrenching European values in Dutch national identity. This counterattack requires
a superior moral stance, one that vehemently opposes anti-democratic forces at
home and abroad, brooking little compromise.

But the fragility of the European project cannot be
underestimated. Mark Rutte and his pro-European coalition have great challenges
ahead, as the forces that are working against them have become increasing
convincing to the general public. If the following four years is fraught with
economic uncertainty, increasing revelations of elitist gluttony and clashes
with Islamic culture, there's a very good chance that Wilders or his Europeskeptic
kin will one day govern the Dutch state.

Who the hell believes Mark Rutte any more?

Before Brexit, the idea that serious opposition to European
hegemony could emerge from Europe itself, seemed implausible, if not downright
laughable to the political elite. Here we see the blind faith in globalisation
as a natural order of progression, and that despite its setbacks, the promise
of economic stability would remain a high priority for voters and all serious
politicians alike. Based on this arrogant assumption that everyone would
automatically see the light and follow it, nationalists were considered fringe
forces able to sway the majority, but never in one’s own country. People
couldn't be so foolish. Things would stay the same. Things will never get out
of hand. Chaos belongs to the past. The future is solid.

But the future is not solid, and never has been. Loss
of trust in the established order is a huge challenge throughout the western
world. This credibility gap, left dormant, will be filled by populists presenting
themselves as outsiders who have peeked into the corrupt and morally corrosive dominant
ideology, and are alone able to stop the machine from swallowing us whole. The
shock-wave that Brexit inflicted on the established order was nothing compared
to the electoral victory of Donald Trump. This was proof to the world that the
geopolitical order, once regarded as the end of history, was under existential threat.

According to Wilders this is all part of the
'patriotic spring' sweeping the western world led by himself and his nationalist
counterparts. This revolutionary phenomenon involves regular people taking back
their sovereignty from the elites and cultural relativists. A warped version of
patriotism entails reconquering the country from backwards people who want to
alter the culture. In order to combat this cultural invasion, Holland must sever
itself from the European Union, so that it can decide its own fate.

Meanwhile, the villainy of the European Union extends
far further than the imposition of an unwelcome immigration policy. Wilders and
his fellow anti-European talking heads blame EU monetary and fiscal policies
for economic inequality. Irresponsible spending on the Greek economy and the
enormous bailouts that followed is repeatedly cited as a prime example of this economic
coalition giving money to a failing system while the people of their own
country are starving.

This notion of establishment betrayal has gone mainstream. During Mark Rutte's bid for a second term in 2012, he
promised to get a grip on financial support for Greece, stating ''enough is
enough”. Yet in 2015, Rutte broke this promise and supported further financial
aid for Greece for the third time. Rutte apologized for breaking this promise
but said that he believed it was for the common good, as the European Union
must honor its members.

Rutte in his second term broke several more promises
(including one about giving one thousand euros to every working person) greatly
reinforcing this perception of the untrustworthy elite that needs to be toppled
so that the regular man can rule again. Notice the similar narrative in Trump's
inauguration speech when he vowed to give the country back to the people. This
is why Wilders asks rhetorically in debate after debate, ''who believes in Mark
Rutte any more?'' It is a cry which encompasses not just the faith lost in
Rutte's candidacy, but in the steer of the European project in general.

Rutte is no
spring chicken

Yet nobody should underestimate Rutte either. Wilders
might know how to energize his base, but Rutte grasps like almost no current
Dutch politician how to play this game. Noticing where Wilders’ rhetoric makes
its impact, Rutte starts to emulate this in a manner that is deemed more
socially acceptable. His rhetoric will be tough, plainspoken without the usual
buzzwords of politicians, but it will never cross a certain line. Probably the
most recent example of this is Mark Rutte's open letter to the Dutch people, in
which he states his worry about the rise of ''loutish'' behavior in the
country. In this letter, he castigates the immigrant who enters the country and
then refuses to assimilate to its values: ''if you reject our country on such
fundamental grounds, I prefer it if you leave. Act normal or get out.''

This blatant campaign ploy, however criticized by many
on the left for focusing on the immigrant and by some on the right for Rutte's
attempt to coat-tail on Wilders' shtick,
was nevertheless a smart move. Rutte knows that most people find Wilders too
extreme. But he also knows that people want to hear a fighting voice speak up
for Dutch national identity. Rutte smartly insinuates himself in between; not
as soft as liberals who refuse to see the dangers coming from Islam, but not
reverting to bigotry either. Rutte's campaign might not have such a spirited
following, but those who worry about immigration but don't want to bear the
stain of having voted for Wilders, find in Rutte a relatively safe compromise.

This is also why the Christian-Democratic fusion party
CDA garnered more votes, with its leader Sybrand Buma increasingly vocal in his
criticism of Islam and any immigrant who refuses to assimilate to Holland's
core values. CDA became the third largest party – together with Democratic 66
(D66) which describes itself as center-right/center-left.

So it is becoming obvious that the Dutch majority (the
turn out was about 80 percent) wants a right-wing leader. But knowing Wilders’
history of provocative and outlandish statements, regardless of how popular it
has made him in certain circles, many in this conservative base still don't feel safe in
voting for him.

Rutte consistently presents himself as the rational
pragmatist who doesn't shy away from making harsh economic reforms, all in the name
of the common good. This narrative is strengthened by an improving economy. So despite
his failed promises, this small surge of optimism made the case for Wilders
weaker. Populism tends to thrive in burgeoning cynicism with regard to the
established order, combined with economic turmoil.

For populists, however, facts matter less. Feelings
are what matter. So, in a debate with Mark Rutte two days before the election,
Wilders made the case that Rutte's so called fiscal responsibility, might
''look good on paper but there's also a reality inside people's houses.'' It's
easy to laugh at the notion that feelings have much to do with the state of the
economy. Yet, people forget that most people, even intellectuals, have little
knowledge about how the economy works. When there's a sense of desperation as
their own health-care premiums and rent goes up, combined with the constant
drip feed of headlines regarding the ultra-wealthy receiving extravagant
bonuses, numbers and the science behind it will be treated skeptically. You can
haul in an economic professor, but he doesn't speak their language. And why
would you listen to someone who doesn't speak your language? Wouldn't you
rather want to listen to a politician who speaks like a normal human being? Who
just states the obvious that the rich are getting richer while the poor are
getting screwed over? And indeed, you aren’t stupid: there are no easy
solutions to stabilizing an economy in crisis. The lesson here is not just a
question of voters' education, but how little trust establishment
politicians have earned from these voters.

This was Rutte's greatest obstacle; salvaging some
kind of credibility and curtailing the cynicism regarding his administration
and the European project. And he did an adequate job at this, the stats helping
to prop him up. His political persona, despite being seen by many as conniving,
works well among the more moderate voters. Meanwhile Wilders did not have a
great campaign. He did too little to spread his message beyond the media venues
that already support him. This is why Rutte took up the mantra that Wilders
was a 'wegloper' – someone who walks away from a fight. And then there is
always the possibility that the 
'patriotic spring' took a knock from Trump's poor performance. Wilders
had spoken gleefully about Trump's victory, stating that ''what can happen in
America, can happen here too.'' But despite the anti-Islamic sentiment shared
by many in Holland, Trump's travel ban may have been a step too far.

All the same, don’t forget Rutte’s loss of seats.
Damage has been done: distrust has grown. It seems within the bounds of reason
that it might grow even more. If circumstances change a little, if there is an
economic downward turn, if Rutte breaks too many promises, then all bets are
off. Rutte and every pro-Europe politician must do whatever it takes to sell
the European project. For Holland has not rejected populism, it has merely put
it on the back-burner, for a rainy day, in case things won't work out.

The search for Holland's national identity goes on

The diplomatic skirmish with Turkey came at the best
time possible. Had Rutte backed down to Erdogan, he knew very well that he
would make himself vulnerable to Wilders' attacks. So his obdurate stance in
not countenancing Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt
Çavuşoğlu's campaign in Holland, and the
hysterics that followed, was a great campaign boost. While Wilders obviously
took advantage of this too, it did grant the doubting voter a little
nationalist pride without the traces of xenophobia that seem permanently lashed
to Wilders' persona. Rutte would have probably won without it, but the incident
proved that people are hungry for a politician with traces of nationalism, of the
respectable kind.

Here we see a sort of truth in Wilders’ insistence
that Holland is undergoing an existential crisis; large groups of citizens are
seeking their Dutch national identity. But what does this really mean? Despite
regional traditions, Holland has always been a global melting pot. There is the
regional pride of Friesland, which often jokes (and sometimes not) about their
wish to secede from Holland and become their own sovereign state. The
Netherlands itself seems to have little to hold onto, compared to other
European countries inflicted with globalism. Countries like Poland and Germany
for example, are still steeped in their idiosyncratic cultures. Holland appears
to me and many other Dutch people to have become a country for everyone, where
everyone can be whoever they want. And maybe that’s where the paradox begins.

Most Dutch do not know their national anthem and
neither do they have an overbearing romanticized version of the past. Compare
that to America, whose politicians boast a country appointed by God itself to
step up to the cause of absolute liberty. If Holland has any defining traits of
national pride, it has to be for its own brand of tolerance. Could it be this,
and the frustration with a less tolerant culture than its own that now prompts
the Dutch to venture into a new kind of nationalism, one that requires less
tolerance and more fury?

For a large proportion of Turkish immigrants, even
those raised in Holland, can muster more passion about the Turkish state than
any regard they will ever have for the Dutch. Liberal and centre-right
opponents must admit some truth to the far-right claim that integration hasn’t
worked in this instance. The massive protest in defence of the Turkish minister
who wasn't allowed to campaign in Holland, was accompanied by swathes of miniature
Turkish flags and Islamic creeds. Seeing this footage makes the call for a tougher
process of integration rather unanswerable, doesn’t it? However liberals want
to spin this, it's simply not normal that a Turkish referendum provokes such
strong reactions from Turkish-immigrants against the Dutch state. With Wilders loudly
reminding us about how these people were given every resource for a neat
standard of living, and this is how they thank them! –  isn’t it
inevitable that this incident will be interpreted in the context of the
European Union's questionable immigration policy, where the engineers of a
globalized Europe allow hostile foreign forces to enter our countries who in
turn, are determined to alter our culture.

As I have
written previously, the
sudden rise of a new party sadly reinforces this point. Tunahan Kuzu, the
leader of Think (Denk), the immigrant-based party, has refused to condemn Erdogan’s
allegation that Holland contains remnants of "a Nazi empire". Throughout their
campaign Think has been mired in controversy; Kuzu’s personal attacks on
immigrant politicians for “betraying their religion and people”; usage of
Internet-trolls to combat critical press coverage; refusal to acknowledge the
Armenian genocide and a host of allegations including one about how doctors
leave immigrants to die quicker than others. Think gained three seats, and that
means that nearly 200,000 members of the electorate voted for a party that
actively stands behind foreign, anti-democratic politicians who vilify the
Dutch state.

Of course, the distrust
of the traditional establishment among a large portion of Turkish immigrants is
a longstanding problem. Of course dissent is a natural reaction to the ever more hostile rhetoric against immigrants
in general in political discourse. But it also convinces more and more people that a strong
national identity must be promoted by the pro-Europeans themselves, if they
want to win this political war.

Bridging the
differences as an alternative?

A strong liberal voice could perhaps bridge these
differences and we have just witnessed the considerable rise of young Jesse
Klaver of the Green Left party (Groenlinks), a party that has gained ten more seats.
Klaver's campaign appealed to a lot of young voters. His rhetoric, including
his focus on wealth inequality, is humane and hopeful. Together with his
youthful vigor and showmanship, this marks him out and sets him apart from the
older traditionalists. And Klaver's rise spelt the dramatic downfall of the
Party of Labor (PVDA), the once mighty social-democratic party who lost a
historic 29 seats, leaving them with only 9 seats.

At least half of their normal immigrant voters went to
Think this time, while others either didn't show up or voted for other liberal
parties. Previously PVDA had been able to rely as well on strategic votes to
counter right-wing parties, but this year they lost a large proportion of
strategic voters who opted for the more exciting voice of either Klaver,
Alexander Pechtold (D66) or even Marianne Thieme's Party of Animals (which
gained 3 more seats this year). Such a massive loss of seats has never occurred
to any Dutch party in history.

But Klaver and his liberal kin will have a tough time
ahead if they want to gain the trust of Europeskeptic voters. This polemical
gap might just be too hard to fill. Only if they manage to create a strong
nationalist persona which appeals to the disenfranchised while convincing them
of the need for a robust European coalition, one that will enforce universal
moral standards – might they do it. They must find a way to counter the
effective propaganda machine of populists and autocrats who keep people distrustful
of anyone connected to the establishment. They must protect the underdog and
voice their opposition against the elites and the banks. They must expose the
true enemies of democracies; the autocrats and kleptocrats, the dividers, the
Trumps, Erdogans and Putins of this world, all those who seek to undermine our
unity in order to gain more power.

Most of all, they must give the Dutch the sense that its culture is a thing to take pride in and that it can withstand any
force that dares to undermine it. Yet this form of nationalism must be guarded
from the populists who so far know like no other, how to wield its great power.
Anything is still possible.